Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition by Ferreira, Fernanda A. & Ferreira, Flávio
Maximum-revenue Tariff with Different Roles in a
Price-setting Competition
Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering 2011 Vol I 
WCE 2011, July 6 - 8, 2011, London, U.K.
ISBN: 978-988-18210-6-5 
ISSN: 2078-0958 (Print); ISSN: 2078-0966 (Online)
WCE 2011
2.1 Simultaneous decision
In this section, we suppose that, in the second stage of the
game, both home and foreign firms play a Bertrand-type
game, i.e., each firm Fi independent and simultaneously
chooses pi. Let the superscript B denote the equilibrium
outcome of the Bertrand-type game.
Theorem 1. In the Bertrand-type game:
(i) The maximum-revenue tariff is given by
tB =
(a− c)(1− b)(2 + b)
2 (2− b2) .
(ii) The prices at equilibrium are given by
pB1 =
a(1− b) (4 + b− 2b2)− c (4− b− b2)
2(2− b) (2− b2)
and
pB2 =
a(1− b) (3− b2)− c (1 + b− b2)
(2− b) (2− b2) .
(iii) The output levels are given by
qB1 =
(a− c) (4 + b− 2b2)
2(1 + b)(2− b) (2− b2)
and
qB2 =
a− c
2(1 + b)(2− b) .
(iv) Home firm’s profit is given by
piB1 =
(a− c)2(1− b) (4 + b− 2b2)2
4(1 + b)(2− b)2 (2− b2)2
and foreign firm’s profit is given by
piB2 =
(a− c)2(1− b)
4(1 + b)(2− b)2 .
2.2 Sequential decisions: Home firm is the
leader
In this section, we suppose that, in the second stage of
the game, the home firm is the leader. Home firm F1
chooses the price p1, and foreign firm F2 chooses p2 after
observing the price p1. Let the superscript L denote the
equilibrium outcome of the game where the home firm F1
is the leader.
Theorem 2. In the case of sequential decisions, with the
home firm as the leader:
(i) The maximum-revenue tariff is given by
tL =
(a− c)(1− b) (4 + 2b− b2)
2 (4− 3b2) .
(ii) The prices at equilibrium are given by
pL1 =
a(1− b) (16 + 12b− 10b2 − 7b3)+ cΓ
4 (2− b2) (4− 3b2)
and
pL2 =
a(1− b) (4 + 2b− b2) (12− 7b2)+ cΘ
8 (2− b2) (4− 3b2) ,
where Γ =
(
16 + 4b− 18b2 − 3b3 + 5b4) and
Θ =
(
16 + 24b− 16b2 − 26b3 + 3b4 + 7b5).
(iii) The output levels are given by
qL1 =
(a− c) (16 + 12b− 10b2 − 7b3)
8(1 + b) (4− 3b2)
and
qL2 =
(a− c) (4 + 2b− b2)
8(1 + b) (2− b2) .
(iv) Home firm’s profit is given by
piL1 =
(a− c)2(1− b) (16 + 12b− 10b2 − 7b3)2
32(1 + b) (2− b2) (4− 3b2)2
and foreign firm’s profit is given by
piL2 =
(a− c)2(1− b) (4 + 2b− b2)2
64(1 + b) (2− b2)2 .
2.3 Sequential decisions: Home firm is the
follower
In this section, we suppose that, in the second stage of
the game, the home firm is the follower. Foreign firm F2
chooses the price p2, and home firm F1 chooses p1 after
observing the price p2. Let the superscript F denote the
equilibrium outcome of the game where the home firm F1
is the follower.
Theorem 3. In the case of sequential decisions, with the
home firm as the follower:
(i) The maximum-revenue tariff is given by
tF =
(a− c)(1− b)(2 + b)
2 (2− b2) .
(ii) The prices at equilibrium are given by
pF1 =
a(1− b) (8 + 6b− b2)+ c (8 + 2b− b2 − b3)
8 (2− b2)
and
pF2 =
3a(1− b)(2 + b) + c (2 + 3b− b2)
4 (2− b2) .
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(iii) The output levels are given by
qF1 =
(a− c) (8 + 6b− b2)
8(1 + b) (2− b2)
and
qF2 =
(a− c)(2 + b)
8(1 + b)
.
(iv) Home firm’s profit is given by
piF1 =
(a− c)2(1− b) (8 + 6b− b2)2
64(1 + b) (2− b2)2
and foreign firm’s profit is given by
piF2 =
(a− c)2(1− b)(2 + b)2
32(1 + b) (2− b2) .
2.4 Comparisons
In this section, we are going to compare the results ob-
tained in each model. First, we observe that, indepen-
dently of the role, both prices are increasing in the tariff.
Next corollary states that the domestic government im-
poses a higher tariff in the game where the home firm
is the leader; and the tariffs are equal in the Bertrand-
type game and in the game where the home firm is the
follower.
Corollary 1. The tariffs in the different games are re-
lated as follows:
tB = tF < tL.
The total sales in the home market are lower in the game
where the home firm is the leader; and they are higher in
the Bertrand-type game, as stated in the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 2. The total sales in the home market are
related as follows:
QL < QF < QB .
In the next two corollaries, we compare the profits of the
firms obtained in each game. We note that the home firm
profits less when it plays a Betrand-type game than in
any other game. However, the preference to be leader or
follower depends upon the value of the degree b to which
goods are substitutes. For low values of the parameter b,
the home firm prefers to be follower; and for high values
of the parameter b, the home firm prefers to be leader.
Furthermore, the foreign firm prefers to be leader, and
the worse situation is to play a Betrand-type game.
Corollary 3. Let
f(b) = 128 + 32b− 336b2 − 176b3 + 172b4 + 107b5,
and let b0 ∈ (0.65, 0.66) such that f(b0) = 0.
(i) If b ≤ b0, then home firm’s profits are related as
follows:
piB1 < pi
L
1 ≤ piF1 .
(ii) If b > b0, then home firm’s profits are related as
follows:
piB1 < pi
F
1 < pi
L
1 .
Corollary 4. Foreign firm’s profits are related as follows:
piB2 < pi
F
2 < pi
L
2 .
3 Conclusions
We studied the maximum-revenue tariff under interna-
tional price-setting competition, with different possible
timings of decisions. We showed that the domestic gov-
ernment imposes a higher tariff in the game where the
home firm is the leader; and the tariffs are equal in the
Bertrand-type game and in the game where the home
firm is the follower. Furthermore, we got that a Betrand-
type game is the situation where both firms profit less.
However, the preference of the home firm to be leader or
follower depends upon the value of the degree b to which
goods are substitutes. For low values of the parameter b,
the home firm prefers to be follower; and for high values
of the parameter b, the home firm prefers to be leader.
In contrast, the foreign firm always prefers to be leader.
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